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THE PROBLEM  
Governments, non-governmental organizations, and community leaders in many 
countries face a daunting task: the design and implementation of policies, programs, 
and systems that help local communities cope with a panoply of threats ranging from 
terrorist attacks to natural disasters. In highly developed societies, this task is often 
compounded by associated problems such as aged, overburdened, and complex critical 
infrastructure systems;1 the catastrophic potential of chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats; and the increasing interconnectivity of many 
global systems of transportation and communication.   
The idea of building resilience to natural and man-made disasters is now a dominant 
strategic theme and operational goal in the current U.S. national security policy 
discourse.2 Yet, even with unlimited resources, it is highly unlikely that a community 
can prevent or protect itself from all the possible dangers it may face. In the United 
States for example, complex distribution systems are now the primary mechanism for 
supplying populations with food and water. Gasoline-powered vehicles remain the 
dominant mode of transportation. Individuals and organizations build their everyday 
activities around complex systems over which they have little control, such as electricity, 
computerized systems, and communication networks supported by distant satellites. 
Each of these modern conveniences allows communities to function more efficiently. Yet 
few people maintain a stockpile of food and water or possess alternative modes of 
transportation, power generation, or communication in the event of an emergency.  
Meanwhile, governments, communities, and individuals have never been so devas-
tatingly unprepared to cope with disturbances to infrastructure, vital resources, or 
public goods and services. Part of the problem is that the efficiencies inherent within 
these complex systems of modern life reduce resilience through a loss in redundancy 
and diversity. Another aspect is that few systems are designed with resilience as a 
specification. The ability of these systems to bounce back after a disaster will have a 
direct impact on the ability of a community to respond and recover. It is thus important 
to consider all the resources that a community must count on when assessing resilience.  
Researchers in varied and distinct disciplines have struggled with the concept of 
resilience in their respective fields for decades.3 Scholars and practitioners continue to 
wrestle with this concept in hope of developing useful prescriptive homeland security 
policy guidance,4 and community-level assessment tools.5 While there is still much to 
debate about how to draft precise definitions of resilience and its attributes, and how to 
operationalize and apply resilience concepts within each discipline, overlap in the 
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research of each discipline is significant enough to be instructive as to what makes 
systems resilient.      
The recent focus on resilience marks a shift from resistance strategies focused solely 
on the anticipation of risk and the mitigation of vulnerability to more inclusive 
strategies that integrate both resistance (prevent, protect) and resilience (respond, 
recover) in the face of disasters. In the past, some scholars have maintained that 
anticipation strategies should be used to focus on known problems, while those geared 
towards resilience are better suited for the unknown. It is important to point out that 
individually, both aspects have shortfalls. Just as planning based on anticipated threats 
can lead to resource investments to counter hazards that never materialize, planning 
from the broader resilience standpoint may call for the short-term diversion of 
resources in an effort to ensure long-term sustainability.6  
Compounding the challenge is the difficulty in developing a flexible planning process 
that responds to changing conditions.7 The greater the uncertainty, the greater the need 
for flexibility.8 Yet, the pervasiveness of “worst-case,” “probabilistic” planning lacks the 
“possibilistic thinking” needed to face both the dangers and the opportunities that no 
one can predict.9 Finding the right balance between anticipation and adaptation, order 
and chaos, resistance and resilience is the challenge each community must face and calls 
for an approach based on continuous learning and transformation,10 rather than 
anticipation and control.11 
This article moves beyond debating definitions of resilience, towards the 
development of a preliminary conceptual framework for assessing community 
resilience. We recognize that not all frameworks are created equal, nor do they satisfy all 
constituent audiences.12 The proposed framework presented herein is consistent with 
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s stated purpose of a framework: to “identify the 
elements (and the relationships among these elements)...to consider for 
analysis...organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry...[and] provide the most general 
set of variables that should be used to analyze all types of settings relevant for the 
framework.”13 It does not outline a cookie-cutter solution for all communities to apply, 
but rather an approach that allows community leaders and policymakers to begin to 
think about resilience as it pertains to their own community’s unique circumstances. 
While sacrificing operational specifics in the interim, it summarizes the core attributes 
of resilient systems (resource performance, resource diversity, resource redundancy, 
institutional memory, innovative learning, and connectedness) in the context of five key 
community subsystems (ecological, economic, physical infrastructure, civil society, and 
governance). Through the examination of each community subsystem, a preliminary, 
community-based, resilience assessment framework is proposed for continued 
development and refinement. 
In leading up to this conceptual framework, however, the article presents the 
definition of resilience used here, an argument for a community-based approach, and a 
description of what we believe the research shows are the core attributes of resilience 
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WHAT IS RESILIENCE? 
In current policy debates, the meaning of resilience varies by disciplinary perspective.  
For most, resilience (with its roots in the Latin word resilio) means to adapt and 
“bounce back” from a disruptive event.14  Similarly, resilience also refers to the ability of 
a system to absorb, change, and still carry on.15 As applied to social systems, resilience 
refers to the capacity of a community system, or part of that system, to absorb and 
recover from disruptive events.16 We have adopted the definition used by scholars at the 
multi-disciplinary Resilience Alliance because it is applicable across the relevant 
systems examined here: the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, undergo 
change, and retain the same essential functions, structure, identity, and feedbacks.17 It 
can be a characteristic of individuals, small groups, networks, organizations, regions, 
nations, or ecosystems. This definition retains the core concepts of those definitions 
semi-officially adopted by federal agencies responsible for homeland security.18  
Note that resilience does not necessarily mean that the system will look just as it did 
before a disturbance or “surprise.” It will maintain its functions but individual parts of 
the system may have changed (adapted) to new conditions in the environment. For 
example, sometimes, when part of a system is not resilient and fails, other parts of the 
system must assume its functions and appropriate its resources. Thus, a resilience 
strategy does not guarantee short-term stability, but rather survivability of the system’s 
essential functions in the long term. Resilience is often an emergent property of the 
system,19 and therefore often difficult to measure and predict. 
Resilience is sometimes confused with the concept of “resistance” – an attempt to 
prevent or stop disruptive events from happening. Resistance strategies include physical 
countermeasures such as trying to stop terrorists from boarding aircraft and building 
firewalls to protect computer systems from intruders. Resilience strategies, on the other 
hand, assume that resistance may not always be possible and thus include the provision 
of or access to alternative resources and services if the resistance strategy fails.  
Resistance is not antithetical to resilience. Rather, resilience subsumes it. If a 
community can resist a disturbance, its resources are robust enough to prevent the 
disturbance from reducing community functioning without any need for adaptation. 
However, a strategy that only directs resources toward resisting threats would almost 
certainly be costly, and possibly conflict with societal norms and individual liberties.  
Moreover, when resistance strategies fail, they have a tendency to fail catastrophically.20   
A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH  
We do not assume that government is the primary guarantor of resilience, although it 
can be an important facilitator. Similarly, we do not assume that there is one optimal set 
of choices or resource allocations for all societies preparing and planning for potential 
“surprises” that may come their way. Nor do we assume that the choices that social 
groups make today will work in the future. Although resilience can be fostered on 
multiple scales, the community is an appropriate level for building basic resilience.  
A central reason we focus on resilience at the community level is because most 
disasters are local and affect communities differently – a flood or earthquake would not 
affect residents of Singapore the same way that it would affect residents of San 
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Francisco, California. Communities are unique and have their own local needs, experi-
ences, resources, and ideas about prevention of, protection against, response to, and 
recovery from different types of disasters. Each community has access to resources and 
the ability to manipulate and make decisions that single individuals do not. Since all 
disaster planning and response requires the immediate involvement of a wide range of 
local institutions (often in concert with state and national organizations), they are 
typically the appropriate level of focus for emergency planning and response activities. A 
community-level focus on resilience – as opposed to a “one-size-fits-all” or “top-down” 
approach – results in local participation, ownership, and flexibility in building 
resilience.21 Moreover, because communities are parts of greater wholes (states, regions, 
and nations), a bottom-up community resilience approach builds state, regional, and 
national resilience concurrently.22 Strengthening local coping capacity can help 
empower local communities rather than foster institutional dependency.23 
A community is a group of people who share a common physical environment, 
resources, and services, as well as risks and threats.  It is also a collective body that has 
boundaries (often geographic), internal and external feedbacks, and “a shared fate.”24 
Because of this, a community is a complex physical and social system comprised of 
many sub-systems.25 For example, a typical metropolitan area encompasses a diverse 
collection of districts and neighborhoods within the central city and its suburbs, with 
very different land-use norms, social interactions, income levels, and access to 
resources. Some experts refer to the “footprint” of a community as the region from 
which a city pulls its resources, that receives the city’s waste, or that depends on the 
city’s economy. This footprint usually reaches well beyond the city limits.26 Disruption 
of community systems can come from external points and have broad effects within and 
without. For instance, the source that generates and provides power to an urban energy 
system is part of that system, but may be located well outside of the given urban area.27 
In contrast, a rural community might be limited to a smaller collective of residents 
inhabiting a valley or mountainous region. Likewise, rural subsystems will vary in form 
and significance to overall community functioning. For instance, the family (as an 
institution) and religious organizations may play a more dominant role in rural settings 
than they do in urban settings.  
Within both communities and regions, there is usually a high level of interaction 
among government, corporate, nonprofit, and individual participants when addressing 
common needs.28 Indeed, many communities already engage in comprehensive 
community planning. Therefore, we presume that communities will define themselves 
in conducting any resilience self-assessment. Also, our analytical model seeks to close 
the practical gap between state-provided security, human safety challenges such as 
disasters and terrorism, and trans-boundary connections between public and private 
resources as well as multiple planning and response levels within communities.29  
Attributes of Community Resilience 
What makes one community bounce back from a disruption quickly while another will 
struggle for years? What is resilience in a community setting? Simply put, it is the ability 
of a community to absorb a disturbance while retaining its essential functions. This does 
not mean that its degree of functionality remains in a constant state but that 
functionality will return in one form or another in a relatively short period of time. To be 
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resilient, the community must have both the resources available and the ability to apply 
or reorganize them in such a way to ensure essential functionality during and/or after 
the disturbance. Furthermore, since the community governance process will differ based 
on each geographical setting, measures taken with the aim of improving a community’s 
assessment of its own resilience must be highly context-specific.30 After a 
comprehensive literature review of resilience in multiple disciplines,31 such as 
organization theory, political science, economics and specific grounding in the tradition 
of ecological resilience and the work of the Resilience Alliance,32 we propose a model 
that allows communities to evaluate and plan for their resilience based on an analysis of 
the robustness of their available resources and adaptive capacity to utilize their 
resources. 
Before elaborating further on what resource robustness and adaptive capacity entail, 
we note the broader implications for communities. Communities with a highly robust 
pool of resources and a high degree of adaptive capacity will be the most resilient. 
However, few communities will have the luxury of possessing high levels of both. If a 
community is either high in resources or high in adaptive capacity, they can afford to 
have somewhat less of the other and remain relatively resilient if they take these assets 
into account in their planning. However, when communities possess low levels of 
resources and low levels of adaptive capacity, they will be less resilient. So, if a 
community is lacking in resources, it should concentrate on building its adaptive 
capacity. For example, if a community lacks funds (resources) for advanced 
communications equipment, it can utilize resources on hand and self-organize in such a 
way (adaptive capacity) to perform the desired function. Hypothetically, two 
communities could have an equal amount of resilience, but a different mix of resources 
and adaptive capacity.  
 
 
Figure 1. Resource Robustness and Adaptive Capacity 
Resource Robustness   
Resources are critical to a community’s sustained functioning and provision of public 
services under a variety of conditions, in times of normalcy or crisis. Communities can 




Community A Community B 
LONGSTAFF  ET AL., BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
6 
redundancy of what is available to them. Resources are defined as “objects, conditions, 
characteristics, and energies that people value.”33 Importantly, this definition 
emphasizes the localized, value-laden quality of such an object or condition. Resources 
considered valuable to one community may not have the same inherent value to 
another, especially across different regions and cultures. Resources that are objects or 
conditions could range anywhere from snowplows to schools, from hospitals to food and 
water supplies, or from social cohesion to economic wealth. Likewise, characteristics 
and energies such as leadership, education level and ethical values could also be 
considered resources to a community. 
Performance “describes the general level of capacity and quality at which an element 
or elements of a system performs an essential role.”34 Performance answers the 
question, “how well does this resource accomplish a particular function?” For example, 
a hammer performs better than a wrench for sinking a nail, because it is designed 
specifically to drive nails into solid objects. Performance of an object or condition also 
includes a quality relative to those of a similar nature. Thus, a stronger, more durable 
hammer performs better than those of inferior design, and thus has a higher relative 
quality. When looking at the function of water distribution within a community it would 
be important to know how well the water system works under average conditions and 
what might make it vulnerable to collapse. 
Diversity is a measure of different types of available resources that perform a 
particular function.35 A community that has high diversity in its available resources for 
critical functions will have a multitude of options for accomplishing those particular 
functions. Hammers, nail guns, and other hard objects all provide a diversity of options 
to sink nails. Yet, if the function is to attach one object to another, adhesives such as 
glue, screws and screwdrivers, staples and staplers, if available, provide a diversity of 
resources to draw upon, albeit with varying degrees of performance. Likewise, if there 
are several communication systems in a community (i.e., radio and reverse-911) there 
will be more chance to reach all citizens with important information and more 
likelihood of reaching people if one of those communication systems becomes 
inoperable.  
Diversity can also come in the form of information and ideas for approaching a 
particular task.  All else equal, a planning team comprised of individuals that come from 
a variety of backgrounds and experiences possesses a greater collective diversity of ideas 
and knowledge and, thus, a greater number of options to tackle a problem, compared to 
a team of individuals from similar backgrounds. 
Redundancy is a quantifiable measure, or count, of a single resource type that 
performs a specific function.36 Redundant resources provide a failsafe, or back-up, when 
any individual unit fails. Redundancy is also a form of operational slack, or buffering 
from external shocks. Having many hammers provides a high degree of redundancy for 
sinking nails. If one breaks, there are more to use. Likewise, emergency savings 
accounts are a form of redundancy in financial terms and allow for the continuance of 
an individual or family’s lifestyle in the event of a job loss or unexpected event. A 
seventy-two-hour emergency preparedness kit allows a household to sustain itself in the 
event of a disaster, until a community response organization can respond and restore 
power and other basic services. 
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However, redundancy is often expensive. It means that there are resources sitting in 
reserve that may not be used – even while the community pays to maintain them.  This 
becomes an important tradeoff that each community must make and depends in large 
part on how valuable a resource is to them and how likely it is that resource will be 
disrupted. 
When combined, the performance, diversity, and redundancy of available resources 
determine a system’s overall robustness.37 That is, its ability to provide critical functions 
under a variety of conditions. For example, the robustness of a water system would be 
greatest when the system has high performance (i.e., sound delivery mechanisms, pipes, 
pumps, etc.), redundancy (i.e., multiple water lines), and diversity (i.e., multiple sources 
such as rivers, lakes, aquifers, and runoff). Every community, and each system within a 
community, must decide how to allocate time and money between performance, 
redundancy, and diversity, keeping in mind that it may be best to have a balance of the 
three attributes – not maximizing one to the detriment of the others.38 
Adaptive Capacity 
A community’s adaptive capacity is a function of the ability of individuals and groups 
to: 1) store and remember experiences; 2) use that memory and experience to learn, 
innovate, and reorganize resources in order to adapt to changing environmental 
demands; and 3) connect with others inside and outside the community to communicate 
experiences and lessons learned, self-organize or reorganize in the absence of direction, 
or to obtain resources from outside sources.39 Thus, institutional memory, innovative 
learning, and connectedness determine the foundation of adaptive capacity on a 
community level. 
Institutional memory is the accumulated shared experience and local knowledge of a 
group of people. Over time, institutional memory is amassed through group-level 
observation and stored in a variety of ways such as documented records or repetitive 
rituals and ceremonies that are carried on as group membership evolves over time.40 
Rituals reinforce institutional memory by facilitating and reinforcing the recollection of 
rules and policies as well as the interpretation of changes or disturbances in the 
environment. Information and knowledge management systems that store, distribute, 
and aid in interpretation of large quantities of data are helpful in retaining institutional 
memory but only if they are accessible by people who need them, when they need them.   
Innovative Learning is the ability of the group to use its information and experience 
to create novel adaptations to environmental changes or to avoid repeating old mistakes. 
Innovation is a form of dynamic learning that places emphasis on the capacity to 
identify and “create new responses or arrangements.”41 Innovative institutions 
sometimes encourage trial-and error type learning by allowing “errors and risk-taking 
behavior.”42 Other times innovations occur in a more deliberate way by putting new 
ideas or resources together with old ones when current strategies are not working. It is 
true that necessity is often the mother of invention. Innovative learning can be reduced 
by a failure to admit that something is not working to provide an important resource or 
function. This kind of learning can be especially difficult when it has to happen as an 
unanticipated disruption is unfolding. During a disruption, spreading information about 
the innovative learning going on in a community (both what is working and what is not 
working) requires a trusted source of information that may or may not be government 
LONGSTAFF  ET AL., BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
8 
or the media. Identification of these trusted communication channels and maintaining 
that trust becomes critical.43 
Innovation and learning are mutually increased through the practice of “adaptive co-
management” which combines a management culture that places a premium on risk 
taking and experiential learning with the linkages and partnerships associated with 
cooperative management.44 Leadership – a vital community resource – plays a pivotal 
role in establishing such a culture.  
The creation of new ideas, resources, processes, and forms of organization are all 
results of innovative learning.45 A community is in a position to learn and innovate 
when individuals and groups are able to experiment through trial and error. Repeated 
variations on experiments create knowledge – and hopefully institutional memory – of 
what new ideas, processes, and organizational designs work and those that do not. 
Ultimately, innovative learning allows the ability of a social group to anticipate both 
future opportunities and future hazards.   
Finally, interpersonal and group connectedness is critical to the diffusion of 
institutional memory and innovative learning throughout the community. Community 
systems and subsystems typically have a variety of internal and external links between 
their various component parts of the system and the higher or lower levels of the system. 
These links are commonly characterized as social (informal) and organizational (formal) 
networks.46 In the absence of formal direction, these connections – which often vary in 
strength47 – contribute to a community system’s ability to exchange, store, and recall 
knowledge, and take collective action in light of changing conditions.   
However, the tightness or looseness of these connections can be both the 
community’s strength and its vulnerability.48 In tightly coupled systems, a change in 
one component (individual or subsystem) of the system engenders an immediate 
response from (or impact on) the other components. For example, an apartment 
complex is a tightly coupled shelter system because a fire in one living unit is likely to 
have an effect on the others. In a rural area, a fire at one farm will not have an 
immediate effect on the others as they are more loosely coupled. The efficiency of 
apartment complexes comes at the cost of less resilience to fires for individual units.  
Yet, in loosely coupled systems, the components have weak enough links that they 
can ignore local disturbances. Since loosely connected units have more independence 
from the full system than tightly coupled ones, they can maintain their equilibrium or 
stability even when other parts of the system are affected by a change in the 
environment. Thus, if either innovation or localized responses to particular problems 
are specified goals, then loosely coupled systems seem most appropriate. For example, a 
more tightly coupled emergency management system would take longer to respond or 
have inappropriate responses for some unanticipated surprises if all the units in the 
system had to wait on centralized, bureaucratic decision making before they could act. 
Still, if the goal is standardization across the entire system, then a tight coupling is more 
likely to yield a desired outcome.  
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Figure 2. Aspects of Community Resilience 
 
When a community possesses a high level of all three traits – institutional memory, 
innovative learning, and connectedness – it, in turn, possesses a high capacity to adapt 
to changes in the environment. If it has a relatively low level of one trait, it can often 
make up for this deficiency by addressing it directly or increasing the levels of the other 
two traits. For example, a large city with low levels of connectedness between ethnic 
groups could address this problem directly by creating bridges for dialogue and 
communication that will, in the event of a disruption, facilitate sharing and diffusion of 
institutional memory and innovative learning across groups. This requires that 
communities build connections and trust before a disruptive event. However, if such a 
strategy proves unfruitful, it may still be able to improve adaptability by increasing the 
access of these groups to a shared knowledge center, or by encouraging innovation and 
learning across all groups. 
Living, or coping, with change and uncertainty requires the capability to integrate 
and apply learning, collective memory, innovation, and collaboration in ways that 
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sustain critical functions over time. A tall order – communities, governments, and 
organizations must continuously look forward, plan for multiple alternative futures, and 
test for or experiment with new ideas, while recalling and interpreting the past. In 
recognizing the directional nature of current hazards and changes, and by identifying 
external drivers of change, these social institutions have the opportunity to design the 
flexibility necessary to anticipate and adjust to change.  
APPLYING A RESILIENCE APPROACH TO COMMUNITY SYSTEMS 
With the ability to make sound self-assessments of their resilience to disasters and 
disruptions, communities can more appropriately prioritize preparedness efforts, 
allocate funding, and develop more innovative ways to organize their material and 
human resources. In order to help communities think about their resilience, our 
approach employs the concepts described above to assess each one of five key 
community subsystems: ecological, economic, civil society, governance, and physical 
infrastructure.49  
These five were chosen based on an exhaustive review of academic and policy-
oriented literature, and lengthy discussions on a set of sub-systems that, together, 
captured the core functions within a community. For example, earlier in our research, 
we included information and communication systems as a stand-alone system for 
analysis, but concluded it overlapped considerably with all other subsystems. We 
recognize that these subsystems are inherently interdependent, overlapping, and 
complex, even in small communities. Ultimately, the set of five key community 
subsystems represents a pragmatic choice between parsimony and exhaustiveness.50 
These five subsystems are a starting point for community analysis and individual 
communities may well identify other subsystems that are important to them. 
Within each subsystem described below, we illustrate some of the attributes and 
characteristics of what we believe indicate resilience in each subsystem; that is, the 
robustness of the resources that make up the subsystem and its adaptive capacity. 
Attributes of resilience will vary depending on the type of system in question. For 
example, diversity in an ecosystem may be the number of different types of species, 
while diversity in an economic system may include the range of skill sets within a labor 
force. The discussion of each subsection is for explanatory purposes only. We do not 
attempt to “prove” the applications suggested or to offer a “how to” for each system. 
However, we hope that more specific guidance for communities will be developed as this 
research progresses.  
Ecological Subsystems 
Ecological systems are the combined biological and physical elements of the 
environment in which a community is located.  
[An] ecosystem is the complex of interconnected living organisms inhabiting a 
particular area or unit of space, together with their environment and all their 
interrelationships and relationships with the environment. An [e]cosystem is 
characterized by the description of populations; [the abundance] of individual 
species; interspecies relationships; activity of organisms; physical and chemical 
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characteristics of environment; flows of matter, energy, and information; and 
description of changes of these parameters with time.51  
Humans are an important part of a community’s ecosystem but they are not the only 
important part. Without outside resources, humans cannot survive if the local 
environment does not support agriculture or provide enough clean water. 
Some parts of an ecological subsystem will be beyond the control of a community, but 
are nonetheless helpful in describing a community’s setting and the natural resources 
the community can use to provide for critical functions in times of disruption. The 
important natural resources might include items such as water supplies, wind patterns, 
climate, soil quality, and topography. The important task for each community is to look 
at the aspects of the ecological systems most valued in order to consider them when the 
community is forced to bounce back from a surprise. For example, it would be 
important to know wind patterns if you must respond to a cloud of volcanic ash or a 
biological attack. It may also be important to know the amount of available land for new 
uses such as temporary shelter construction. In addition, a diversity of habitats would 
allow some flora and fauna to survive if one habitat is rendered uninhabitable. Will 
these habitats support local food production? Does the environment support growing 
other crops if the current ones become economically unsustainable? 
The adaptive capacity of ecological subsystems might be measured by how quickly 
key elements of the local environment can regenerate in the event of a disaster such as 
flooding or fire.52 Grasses and insects will regenerate much faster than trees and 
mammals due to the length of their life cycles. Through evolution, many plants have 
developed adaptive capacity that allows them to be resilient because they “remember” 
how to bounce back from dangers such as fire by developing protective surfaces on their 
seeds. For agriculture, this adaptation period will be the time it takes to prepare the land 
and then plant either the existing crop or a new one that is more appropriate to new 
ecological (or economic) conditions. New crops may need new machinery and 
specialized knowledge to accomplish successful adaptation. Indicators of adaptive 
capacity include the ability of the environment to support a diversity of crops and 
wildlife.  
Economic Subsytems 
Economic systems are comprised of people, firms and institutions that interact to 
accomplish the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. A 
resilient economy can be essential for recovery efforts in a post-disaster setting.53 The 
resources of an economic system are robust if they can deliver critical goods and services 
under a variety of conditions. The changes in conditions may happen quickly, like a 
flood. Or they may occur over a longer period of time, like climate change or the 
movement of firms to new markets. 
A major disaster or catastrophic event could potentially put many economic activities 
at risk. Resilient local economic systems will have plans to get small businesses up and 
running to ensure that people feel safe going to markets, and to assure the public that 
the flow of currency is secure and individual bank accounts are protected. The first 
decision will be whether to try to return the economic system to its previous state or to 
adapt to new conditions. 
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Resource robustness in an economic subsystem would generally include 
performance, diversity, and redundancy within the labor markets and capital markets 
and ‘land’ or natural resources within a given community. According to some 
economists, the measure of these resources denotes the potential for “shock-
absorption.”54 To assess the resources within an economic subsystem, economists might 
look at the conditions of the labor market, the make-up of the community’s businesses, 
the preferences of consumers, measures of unemployment, and growth and/or inflation, 
among other signals. 
Adaptive capacity in an economic subsystem might come in the form of policy options 
available to business or government leaders, such as whether to borrow, trade, finance, 
or substitute goods. Such tools increase the potential for “shock-counteraction,”55 and 
amount to the ability of the economic subsystem to innovate and learn. To assess the 
adaptive capacity in an economic subsystem, experts could consider the fiscal position 
of the community – a healthy position would allow leaders to cut taxes or raise expenses 
to counteract the harmful shock. Economists might also look at the community’s 
freedom to trade or make adjustments to trading relationships. In the labor market, 
economists might look at the ability of workers to change jobs or get new training in 
various industries. 
Physical Infrastructure Subsystems 
Physical infrastructure “refers to the substructure or underlying foundation or network 
used for providing goods and services; especially the basic installations and facilities on 
which the continuance and growth of a community, state, etc., depend...[and] include 
roads, water systems, communications facilities, sewers, sidewalks, cable, wiring, 
schools, power plants, and transportation and communication systems.”56 The 
practitioners, engineers, and policy makers that use, design, and manage these assets 
are included within the subsystem as well. 
Assessing the resource robustness within a community’s physical infrastructure 
subsystem would require an accounting for each of the infrastructure sectors listed 
above, especially considering that the robustness of each sector could vary dramatically 
within the same community. A community could have a superior transportation system, 
but a woefully inadequate water system. In addition, communities have varying control 
over the complex, networked infrastructure systems on which they rely. For example, 
many communities rely on power from the electric grid. Thus, they are unable to affect 
the performance or redundancy of their own energy infrastructure because it is 
managed and regulated on a broader scale. Realizing this, communities might work to 
require these higher levels of regulation to include appropriate redundancy to ensure 
that the system can bounce back after a disruption. Potentially costly, redundant 
telephone switches or electric generation and transmission capacity would almost 
certainly be paid for through increased rates for businesses and consumers. This 
illustrates tradeoffs that must be made between increasing resilience and reducing costs 
in the short term.  
An adaptive capacity assessment in a given infrastructure sector depends, in part, on 
the nature of the component under consideration. Some components are structured or 
designed to adapt. The internet, for example, automatically reroutes information around 
damaged networks. Other components that consist of fixed resources, like a 
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transportation system that consists of bridges and roads, can only adapt in the short 
term through innovation by the system’s users and managers that reroutes traffic 
around damaged areas.   
Civil Society Subsystems 
For our purposes, “civil society” refers to the formal and informal modes of social 
organization and collective action outside of governmental authority (i.e., non-
governmental and philanthropic organizations, health and human service organizations, 
faith-based organizations, unions, associations, etc.). These institutions contribute to 
community values, provide forums for civic action and dialogue, and enhance quality of 
life and social welfare. They are often key players in recovery from a sudden disruption 
such as a natural disaster. 
Assessing the resource robustness within a community’s civil society subsystem 
would entail accounting for the diversity (number of different types) of civil society 
organizations, their redundancy (total number by category), and the performance of 
these diverse organizations in accomplishing their missions. A large number of 
volunteer organizations in a community may appear to offer high redundancy, but if 
these organizations experience difficulties maintaining membership, mobilizing 
support, or accomplishing meaningful projects for the community, they may not nec-
essarily be considered robust resources. 
An adaptive capacity assessment in a given community would require a careful 
examination of the mechanisms and procedures the civil society uses to retain and recall 
its collective experiences, the production of new and innovative techniques for achieving 
community goals, and the strength of ties between civil society organizations. Using the 
volunteer sector again as an example, indicators such as organizational longevity, 
employee turnover, and growth of new organizations would provide a general sense of 
institutional memory. However, this should also take into account how organizations 
retain and embed their experiences in processes and individuals. 
Governance Subsystems 
Systems of governance include the public organizations (political, administrative, 
legislative, and judicial institutions) that contribute to the administration of government 
functions of the community. There may be overlap into the social and private spheres 
through public-private partnerships. Governance also includes the processes through 
which government institutions, or any group of people with a mandate or with a 
common purpose, make decisions.57 Governance also sets the parameters for ordered 
rule, cooperative action,58 decision-making, and power sharing through institutions.59 
Assessing the resource robustness of a community’s governance subsystem is often 
limited to a performance assessment in terms of the governing entities themselves 
because competing governing entities sometimes undermine the functions of the 
system. This is apparent in post-conflict communities that suffer from diverse governing 
structures (tribal, national, and intervening structures) all operating at once. 
Performance may be measured in multiple ways – from the cost and quality of services 
delivered in relation to the resources collected from the citizens, to the strength of the 
government’s mandate to act on the citizens’ behalf.60 In some communities there may 
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be great value in having redundancy and diversity in staffing, especially for critical 
functions and resources, even if this is not efficient and costs more in the short term. 
An adaptive capacity assessment in a given community would entail a range of 
inquiries. Does the government have the capacity to institutionalize and adapt lessons-
learned, such as modifying emergency response plans following an event? How 
extensive is the discretionary authority granted to government officials during a crisis 
(for example, the authority to commandeer resources or waive regulatory restrictions as 
needed)? How connected are the various units of government in times of disruption? 
DEVELOPING AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
The critical elements of a local resilience assessment include an unflinching look at the 
five subsystems as they really are and a willingness to see possibilities for putting 
resources together in new ways in the event of a disruption. At a minimum, a 
comprehensive community resilience assessment would entail an examination across 
each of the five subsystems that make up the community, as briefly described above. 
Communities should assess each subsystem’s resource robustness in terms of 
performance, diversity, and redundancy as well as its adaptive capacity in terms of 
institutional memory, capacity for innovation, and internal and external connectedness. 
Each system must be initially assessed separately because the attributes of resilience are 
manifested differently. Overlaps between these subsystems should then be dealt with to 
form a picture of the whole. 
The following list of questions represents the most basic level of examination to 
assess the resilience of a community subsystem. 
  
Basic Questions for Resilience Assessment 
 Which functions are vital to our community within this subsystem? 
 What resources are available to perform this function? 
• How well does this resource perform a particular function? How well would it 
perform in a disruption? (Performance) 
• How much of this resource do we have? (Redundancy) 
• Are there other resources available that could perform this function? 
(Diversity) 
 To what extent do organizations and informal social groups within this subsystem instill 
and maintain a common memory? (Institutional Memory) 
 To what extent do organizations and informal social groups within this subsystem foster 
a culture of continuous learning and innovation? (Innovative Learning) 
 To what extent are organizations and informal social groups within this subsystem 
internally and externally connected?  Are they loosely connected or tightly connected?  
How will a disturbance that affects one organization or social group impact others?  
(Connectedness)  
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While this list of questions appears rudimentary, it can easily lead to a lengthy set of 
functions and resources under each subsystem, accompanied by evaluative criteria 
and/or indicators for each resilience attribute (performance, redundancy, diversity, 
institutional memory, innovative learning, and connectedness). The boxes below 
provide a simple breakdown of how an analysis would be organized by subsystem with 
one or two example indicators. The potential depth and comprehensiveness of such an 
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Figure 3. Resilience Analysis Breakdown (with example indicators) 
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As stated previously, this article outlines a preliminary conceptual framework for 
assessing resilience. It is a first step toward moving beyond academic debates and 
toward a useful policy tool. While discussion and debate will – and should – continue on 
the exact nature of resilient systems in the various disciplines, we believe there is a 
significant enough overlap in the research to propose this framework for more concrete 
analysis. Just as no one definition of resilience will fully satisfy participants in this 
diverse field of research and practice, no one tool will be equally satisfying or sufficient. 
What matters is that communities have an approach that is relatively easy to understand 
and use to guide decision-making. 
Notably, this framework is community-based, holistic, and scalable. The design 
allows planners and policy-makers to conduct a resilience assessment that is adapted to 
fit their own particular circumstances, based on the assumption that communities 
themselves are best able to identify and make value judgments regarding which 
functions and resources matter most. Communities are also better equipped than 
outside evaluators to determine the scale and scope of the geographic and political 
boundaries that define them. In addition, because the proposed framework is scalable, it 
can potentially allow for application on multiple levels of state, regional, and 
international governance. 
We acknowledge that this framework requires further development both in academic 
circles and communities. Options include assembling experts from each subsystem to 
evaluate how to best measure the resilience attributes (resource robustness and adaptive 
capacity) quantitatively, qualitatively, or in combination. Researchers might develop a 
catalog of evaluative questions to be assessed, scaled, and normalized according to 
subsystem, and then aggregate these questions to form a collective resilience index. 
Another option involves extensive case study analysis. 
Lastly, the resilience approach described here is no panacea for addressing the wide 
range of natural and man-made threats to society. Nor should it completely supplant 
risk- and vulnerability-based approaches to homeland security. Rather, all of these 
efforts should be mutually supporting. But until researchers and practitioners move 
beyond the definitional debate and get on with developing something useful in the field, 
resilience will remain nothing more than just another good concept and meaningless 
buzz-word. 
  
This article is based on research presented in P.H. Longstaff, N. Armstrong, and K. Perrin, 
“Building Resilient Communities: Tools for Assessment,” Project on Resilience and Security 
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